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Non-technical summary 
The idea that government debt accumulation has implications for long-term 
government bond interest rates is a common feature in a number of – otherwise diverse 
– theoretical models. One could expect that increases in the debt-to-GDP ratio or in the 
government deficit ratios may imply an increase in the long-term interest rate, since it 
may impinge negatively on the credit risk of the sovereign debt liabilities. Indeed, 
market participants may perceive an additional risk stemming from the implied 
loosening of fiscal stance under such conditions 
From a policymaking point of view the relationship between government debt and 
deficit, and long-term interest rates is rendered timely in the context of central bank 
independence when pressures for macroeconomic activism are exercised on fiscal 
authorities, notably to face severe economic downturns and financial disruption. In the 
euro area and the EU the effects of fiscal policy stance on long-term interest rates have 
an additional dimension. Less prudent fiscal policies are not considered to be aligned 
with the fiscal limits set by the Maastricht treaty. Moreover, it is often argued that large 
and unsustainable deficits can endanger the coherence of national macroeconomic 
policies and may jeopardize the price-stability oriented monetary policy.  
We assess the short and long-run determinants of real long-term government bond 
yields for a set of OECD countries, employing a dynamic panel approach for the period 
1973-2008, to test for the existence of cointegration between real long-term interest 
rates and its potential determinants. Furthermore, we also resort to simulation and 
bootstrap methods to compute the critical values and to take into account the cross-
country dependences regarding this segment of the capital markets. Afterwards, we 
estimate a complete panel error-correction model in order to also uncover the short-run 
parameters and the speed of convergence to the long-run relationship, taking advantage 
of non-stationary panel data econometric techniques. 
The panel framework allows using information contained in the cross-section 
dimension and to increase the performance and accuracy of the tests. In addition, cross-
country dependence can mirror common changes in the behaviour of fiscal authorities, 
for instance in the run-up to European and Monetary Union, the Stability and Growth 
Pact framework and peer pressure. Using the information contained in the cross-section 
dimension allows reflecting capital markets views, due notably to financial markets 
integration and liberalisation, or increased business cycle synchronization. From an 
economic point of view, it is also relevant to find such cross-section dependence, both   4
for the financial series and for the macroeconomic and fiscal variables. In fact, this 
provides evidence of significant capital market integration at the OECD level, which 
sovereign government debt issuers cannot discard lightly.  
The results of our analysis also show that in addition to common movements in 
sovereign yields, and credit and liquidity risk, investors are also aware of such country 
specific fundamentals as inflation, budgetary and current account imbalances, and real 
effective exchange rates. A better (more positive) government budget balance reduces 
(as expected) the real long-term interest rate in almost all countries. Moreover, the 
developments in current account balances also carry relevant long-run information for 
real interest rates. Indeed, the deterioration of the current account balance would signal 
a widening gap between savings and investment and long-term interest rates may be 
pushed upwards. 
Moreover, our results illustrate that over the longer run real long-term interest 
rates and their potential determinants move together in this sample of OECD countries. 
Therefore, identifying the determinants of real long-term interest rates, over long 
periods as captured by the cointegration analysis, offers additional valuable information 
notably for financing choices decisions by the sovereign issuers and government 
investment decisions.  Interestingly, some long-run determinants of real long-term 
interest rates, which were uncovered in the panel cointegration estimation, such as 
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1. Introduction 
The idea that government debt accumulation has implications for long-term 
government bond interest rates is a common feature in a number of – otherwise diverse 
– theoretical models. The long-run relationship between fiscal variables and long-term 
interest rates also constitutes an important part of policymakers’ conventional wisdom. 
One could expect that increases in the debt-to-GDP ratio or in the government deficit 
ratios may imply an increase in the long-term interest rate, since it may impinge 
negatively on the credit risk and on the quality of the outstanding sovereign debt 
liabilities. Indeed, market participants may perceive an additional risk stemming from 
the implied loosening of fiscal stance under such conditions (see Alesina et al., 1992, 
and Ardagna et al., 2004). However, and as mentioned by Elmendorf and Mankiw 
(1999), difficulties arise when assessing the fiscal effects on long-term interest rates, 
since interest rates are likely to be linked to fiscal policy expectations, which is not an 
easy concept to measure. 
Apart from default or creditworthiness, liquidity risk is also relevant for sovereign 
bond holders. Indeed it is logical to assume that sovereign debt investors look at both 
credit and liquidity risk, although liquidity seems to play a bigger role in times of 
market unrest (see, for instance, Beber et al., 2009). 
Moreover, several other explanations can be at the root of the long-run 
developments of long-term yields, in addition to fiscal fundamentals: external variables 
and imbalances, liquidity issues, inflation rate developments, growth developments, and 
possible substitution or demonstration effects from the equity segment of the capital 
markets. 
From a policymaking point of view the relationship between government debt and 
deficit, and long-term interest rates is rendered timely in the context of central bank 
independence when pressures for macroeconomic activism are exercised on fiscal 
authorities, notably to face severe economic downturns and financial disruption. In the 
euro area and the EU the effects of fiscal policy stance on long-term interest rates have 
an additional dimension. Less prudent fiscal policies are not considered to be aligned 
with the fiscal limits set by the Maastricht treaty. Moreover, it is often argued that large 
and unsustainable deficits can endanger the coherence of national macroeconomic 
policies and may jeopardize the price-stability oriented monetary policy.  
In this study we assess the short and long-run determinants of real long-term 
government bond yields for a set of OECD countries, employing a dynamic panel   6
approach for the period 1973-2008, to test for the existence of cointegration between 
real long-term interest rates and its potential determinants. Furthermore, we also resort 
to simulation and bootstrap methods to compute the critical values and to take into 
account the cross-country dependences regarding this segment of the capital markets. 
Specifically, we take advantage of non-stationary panel data econometric techniques 
and the new Common Correlated Effect (CCE) estimator (Pesaran, 2006, that allows 
common factors in the cross equation covariances to be removed). 
Another important issue is how to model the reduced form relationship in the 
presence of possible non-stationarity in the panel. Indeed, a cursory reading of the 
formal literature on determinants of real long-term government bond yields in stochastic 
general equilibrium suggests that given the panel data employed, there could also be 
relevant short-run effects, which may vary across countries. Thus, in order to address 
this issue we employ the Pooled Mean Group approach of Pesaran, Shin and Smith 
(1999) to sort out the long-run versus short-run effects of the EU member states 
respective fiscal policies. The advantage of such approach is that it addresses the issue 
of unit-roots in the panel data and also allows for short run versus long run analyses of 
long-term sovereign bond yields in the same specification. Individual countries may 
well be on the same long-run path albeit with different short-run cyclical effects.  
The panel framework allows using information contained in the cross-section 
dimension and to increase the performance and accuracy of the tests. In addition, cross-
country dependence can mirror common changes in the behaviour of fiscal authorities, 
for instance in the run-up to European and Monetary Union (EMU), the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) framework and peer pressure. Using the information contained in 
the cross-section dimension allows better reflecting capital markets views, due notably 
to financial markets integration and liberalisation, or increased business cycle 
synchronization. The existence of possible cross-section dependence, naturally relevant 
from an economic perspective, has been essentially unaccounted for in the applied 
related literature. However, one indeed expects capital markets’ variables to be rather 
interlinked, while co-movements and cross-country spillovers are also expected at the 
macro level. Therefore, we also contribute to the literature in this respect. 
Naturally, it is also important to i) grasp to what extent fiscal and macro variables 
move sovereign yields; and ii) to assess whether country differences arising from 
specific factors (government debt, current account balance, inflation), on top of 
common movements, may also be paramount regarding heterogeneous behaviour on   7
sovereign yields. For instance, inflation and exchange rate developments can illustrate 
the behaviour of the monetary authorities towards price stability. In addition, in the 
context of financial crisis with overall risk aversion and uncertainty rising and 
increasing sovereign debt issuance, good fiscal performances also becomes more 
relevant, from the perspective of financial markets. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews the 
related literature. Section three presents the methodology. Section four conducts the 
empirical analysis and discusses the results. Section five concludes the paper. 
 
2. Related literature 
The participants in the capital markets may perceive additional risks stemming 
from the loosening of fiscal policies, which would then be reflected in higher bond 
yields demanded from sovereign issuers. Such increased risks usually also have an 
adverse impact on the sovereign debt ratings. For instance, Afonso et al. (2007, 2009) 
show that fiscal developments are among the relevant determinants of a country’s credit 
rating, together with macroeconomic and government effectiveness variables. 
On the other hand, capital markets may also value the increased liquidity 
associated to the existence of additional outstanding sovereign debt for a given country, 
and a decrease in the long-term yields cannot be discarded as well, given that default 
risk has been perceived in the past as rather subdued in the EU context (see Codogno et 
al., 2003, Bernoth et al., 2004, and Afonso and Strauch, 2007). 
Certainly, the relationship between fiscal variables, such as government debt and 
budget deficits, and long-term interest rates and its several possible determinants 
remains largely an empirical question. Studies done in the 1980s, essentially for the US, 
in the context of crowding-out discussions were inspired by this debate (see, for 
instance, Evans, 1985, Wachtel, and Young, 1987, and Rose and Hakes, 1995). Indeed, 
abundant literature exists on the Ricardian versus non-Ricardian nature of fiscal policy 
(see, for instance, Afonso, 2008).  
The related existing evidence does not seem to be clear cut in favour or against the 
relationship between government debt, deficit and long-term interest rates relationship. 
Some more recent literature tries to assess the empirical evidence regarding notably the 
fiscal determinants of long-term interest rates, notably the relevance of future fiscal 
variables. For instance, Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002), who evaluate for the US 
the effect of CBO budget surplus projections on interest rates spreads, conclude that   8
higher projected surpluses imply lower spreads of long-term rates over short-term rates. 
Engen and Hubbard (2004) regress the current real 10-year treasury rate on CBO 5-year 
ahead federal debt and deficit projections, and report that increases in the expected 
federal debt-to-GDP ratio increase the current real 10-year Treasury yield. 
Again for the US, Laubach (2009) regresses expected future interest rates on 
projections published by the CBO and the OMB for the deficit-to-GDP ratio and the 
debt-to-GDP ratio 5 years ahead. According to the results, a one percentage point 
increase in the projected deficit-to-GDP ratio is estimated to raise long-term interest 
rates by roughly 25 basis points. In addition, in related research Thomas and Wu (2009) 
also used fiscal projections for the US.  
For instance, in the context of a no-arbitrage affine term structure model for the 
US, Dai and Philippon (2005) also report that although the response of sovereign yields 
to fiscal shocks is mitigated in the shorter side of the yield curve, the response is 
amplified for the case of the 10-year bonds. 
For the EMU countries (except Luxembourg), Faini (2006) argues that an 
expansionary fiscal policy in one EMU member will have a twofold effect, first on its 
spreads, and second on the overall level of interest rates for the currency union as a 
whole. Bernoth, von Hagen, and Schuknecht (2004) report that EU countries’ sovereign 
bonds interest differentials, vis-à-vis Germany or the US, contain risk premia which 
increase with government debt, deficit, and debt-service, and also depend positively on 
liquidity, i.e. the issuer’s relative bond market size. 
In the European Union context, Heppke-Falk and Hüfner (2004) report that 
monthly deficit forecasts from financial market participants fiscal projections for 
France, Germany and Italy, over the period 1994-2004, have no significant effect on 
interest rate swap spreads of 10-year Treasury bonds. Afonso and Strauch (2007) in the 
context of an event-study of fiscal policy announcements in 2002, show that such fiscal 
events had small effects on daily swap spreads, mostly around five basis points or less. 
Using high frequency daily data, from January 1999 to April 2008, Manganelli and 
Wolswijk (2009) report that for the EMU members government bond spreads react 
more to short-term interest rate increases when the sovereign credit risk increases and 
that liquidity also plays a role.  
On the other hand, Afonso (2009), using a panel of semi-annual vintages of 
growth and fiscal forecasts of the European Commission, shows that 10-year 
government bond yields increase with better growth forecasts, and with decreases in   9
budget balance-to-GDP ratios, signalling that sovereigns may need to pay more to 
finance anticipated higher budget deficits in the market.
1 
Table 1 offers a summary of some of the findings in the abovementioned related 
literature, within different methodological frameworks. Interestingly, from the studies 
surveyed, the concern regarding the assessment of possible cross-section dependences 
and its technical, empirical, and economic implications for the analysis seems to be 
essentially absent.   
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SUR estimation  No significant impact of 
expected deficits on swap 
spreads over the whole 
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OLS. Regress expected 
future interest rates on 
CBO and OMB 
projections for the deficit-
to-GDP ratio and the 
debt-to-GDP ratio 5 years 
ahead. 
1 percentage point increase in 
the projected deficit ratio (debt 
ratio) raises long-term interest 
rates by roughly 25 (3 to 4) 
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3. Methodology 
In the subsequent empirical analysis, an initial baseline specification for the real 
long-term government bond yield, r, can be written as  
 
                                                 
1 Such results are in line with the Gale and Orszag (2003) assessment of the existence of statistically 
significant effects from anticipated budget deficits on long-term interest rates.   10
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where i is the long-term nominal government bond yield,  is the inflation rate, and X 
includes a set of additional explanatory variables. The index i (i=1,…, N) denotes the 
country, the index t (t=1,…, T) indicates the period, i stands for the individual effects 
to be estimated for each country i, and uit the disturbances.  
An error-correction form for the real long-term interest rates, which move towards 
their long-run level with a speed of adjustment , is given by  
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where vit are the disturbances. 
Specification (1) illustrates a long-run relationship for the long-term real 
government bond yield. Among the several long-run factors influencing the long-term 
real interest rate that are included in X, we consider such determinants as: the 
government balance-to-GDP ratio, the debt-to-GDP ratio, the current account balance 
ratio, inflation surprises, the real effective exchange rate, and a liquidity measure. 
As mentioned above, financial markets want to differentiate among sovereign debt 
issuers due to the existence of different country-specific credit risk and of a non-zero 
probability of sovereign default. Therefore, such variables as the government balance 
and the debt-to-GDP ratios could convey relevant information regarding a country 
credit risk and help in explaining cross-country financial risk premia. On the other hand, 
we do not want to expand too much the possible set of variables since we are aiming at 
a parsimonious empirical specification, while for the purposes of the subsequent error 
correction analysis it is also preferable not to have too may variables. 
In addition, such fiscal indicators also allow financial markets to assess the fiscal 
future developments in sovereign borrowers and its perceived credit risk, the country’s 
long-run solvency, and repayment likelihood. Therefore, relevant information regarding 
a country’s debt burden and whether its public finance behaviour is sustainable, or if the 
risk for a build-up of government debt arises.
2 In other words, they help in gauging 
whether a country can make the interest payments on the outstanding stock of 
                                                 
2 Afonso and Rault (2010) report that over the period 1970-2006 some EU countries may have been 
threading unsustainable public finances’ paths.   11
government debt, without being necessarily forced into additional borrowing in the 
market and embarking in an unpleasant debt arithmetic trap. 
Regarding inflation developments, inflation variability is also relevant in order for 
market participants to assess whether an environment of low inflation is in place, 
notably via the occurrence of inflation surprises. One can hypothesise that since with 
high inflation a government tends to unilaterally and partially inflate away from its 
fiscal indebtedness, the need for a higher nominal and real long-term bond yield cannot 
be discarded. Moreover, expected inflation is also seen as an indicator of 
macroeconomic stability, and higher inflation implies higher sovereign risk. Deviations 
from past inflation can be assumed from the actual inflation rate, or taken as an average 
of past observations. 
In addition, the external imbalance of a country, for instance as proxied by the 
current account balance-to-GDP ratio, can convey the existence of a gap between saving 
and investment and provide expectations regarding a future depreciation of the domestic 
currency. Under those circumstances the risk premia demanded by the markets on 
sovereign debt may also increase. Moreover, external imbalances tend to be linked to 
fiscal imbalances from a long-term perspective, notably when private saving does not 
increase sufficiently to offset the effects of increased budget deficits, and then they may 
also impinge via such channel on long-term bond yields.
3 In addition, real effective 
exchange rate developments are linked to a country’s foreign competitiveness while 
being also linked to current account balance positions. 
Sovereign debt yields also tend to be related to the depth or liquidity of the 
respective outstanding bond market. Indeed, liquidity risk is usually inversely related to 
the size of the respective market. Therefore, it seems also useful to consider a measure 
of liquidity as a possible determinant of long-term government bond yields. Our 
liquidity measure, liquidity debt share, is given by the share of outstanding government 
debt in country i, in year t, in the overall outstanding government debt of the full set of 
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where the index i=1, …, N indicates the country. 
                                                 
3  Afonso and Rault (2008) uncover significant effects between budget balances and current account 
balances for several OECD countries.   12
Naturally, one has to be aware that full liberalisation and integration of capital and 
bond markets was not in place for the entire time sample under analysis. Indeed, capital 
markets were gradually liberalised in the 1970s and 1980s. For instance, this was a 
mandatory requirement for EU countries at the start of stage two of EMU, in 1994. 
Another caveat is the fact that some home bias can arise among investors, for instance, 
some institutional investors may face constraints leading to portfolio investments in the 
home country. In a stepwise approach we then i) assess cross-country dependences; ii) 
test for panel unit roots; iii) estimate the panel cointegration relationships and iv) assess 
the respective magnitudes of cointegration. 
Afterwards, and once we have estimated the long-run relationships between real 
long-term interest rates and their potential determinants via the computation of the 
common correlated effect CCE and CCE-MG (Mean Group) estimators (Pesaran, 
2006), we also a estimate complete panel error-correction (PECM) models given by 
equation (2) with the Pooled Mean Group approach of Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999). 
This framework allows us to assess the adjustment mechanism to a deviation from the 
long-run equilibrium relationship along with the short-run dynamics. Note that the 
CCE-MG estimator yields consistent estimates even in the presence of common factors 
and is the most efficient (Kapetanios and Pesaran, 2007) and robust to alternative 
hypotheses of non-stationarity of variables (Coakley et al., 2006). 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Data 
In our analysis we consider, for the period 1973-2008, the following set of 17 
OECD countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, UK, Canada, Japan, and U.S. 
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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, and authors’ calculations. 
 
From a simple visual inspection we can observe an upward movement in real 
long-term interest rates until the beginning of the 1980s, followed by a subsequent 
downward trend until the end of the time sample. Real long-term interest rates have 
been essentially positive apart from the period of the seventies and early eighties, when 
high inflation rates were also prevalent, particularly in such countries as Finland, Italy, 
Japan, Portugal, Spain, and the UK.   14
Regarding the liquidity measure that we computed following (3), Table 1 shows 
that the U.S. and Japan accounted in 2008 for more than half of the outstanding stock of 
sovereign debt in the set of OECD countries considered in our country sample. 
We build inflation surprises (
e) taking the difference between actual inflation and 
a 2-year moving average of past inflation (see the Appendix for data sources). 
 
Table 1 – Shares of outstanding government debt in the total outstanding debt of the 
country sample 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2008 
Austria 0.35 0.90 0.94 0.73 0.88 
Belgium 2.02 2.90 2.59 1.44 1.54 
Canada   3.84 4.45 3.42 3.27 
Denmark   0.85 0.86 0.48 0.39 
Finland 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.31 0.31 
France 7.41 4.48 4.45 4.38 6.63 
Germany 4.74 8.97 7.37 6.53 8.17 
Ireland 0.26 0.46 0.45 0.21 0.40 
Italy 5.10 8.18 10.90 6.90 8.31 
Japan 3.06 18.28 21.19 36.70 28.83 
Luxembourg 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 
Netherlands 2.88 2.56 2.30 1.19 1.73 
Portugal   0.30 0.42 0.33 0.55 
Spain 0.73 1.16 2.26 1.98 2.16 
Sweden 1.18 1.62 1.02 0.76 0.62 
U K  1 2 . 1 38 . 9 33 . 4 23 . 4 94 . 7 1  
US 59.93 36.36 37.16 31.15 31.45 
 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
                         Source: European Commission AMECO database and authors’ computations. 
 
4.2. Cross-section dependence 
In recent years it has become more widely recognized that the advantages of panel 
unit root tests within the macro-panel setting include the use of data for which the spans 
of individual  time series data are insufficient for the study of many hypotheses of 
interest. The adoption of such new panel data methods is preferred to the usual time 
series techniques to circumvent the well known problems associated with the low power 
of traditional unit root tests. Therefore the body of literature on panel unit root and 
panel cointegration testing has grown considerably in the past ten years and now 
distinguishes between: first-generation tests (Maddala and Wu, 1999, Levin et al., 2002, 
and Im et al., 2003) developed on the assumption of the cross-sectional independence of 
panel units (except for common time effects), which is often unrealistic in many 
empirical settings; and second-generation tests (Bai and Ng, 2004, Smith et al., 2004,   15
Moon and Perron, 2004, Choi, 2006, and Pesaran, 2007) allowing for a variety of 
dependence across the different units. These tests differ according to the way they 
eliminate the factors of structural dependence and the way they aggregate the individual 
information.
4 
Therefore, the first question to deal with is the possible presence of cross-section 
dependence in the data. Indeed, as put in evidence for instance, by O’Connell (1998) in 
the case of PPP testing, or by Banerjee et al. (2005), panel unit root tests of the first 
generation can lead to spurious results (because of size distortions) if there exists 
significant degrees of error cross-section dependence and this is ignored. Consequently, 
the implementation of second-generation panel unit root tests is desirable only when it 
has been established that the panel is effectively subject to a significant degree of error 
cross-section dependence. In the cases where cross-section dependence is not 
sufficiently high, loss of power might result if second-generation panel unit root tests 
that allow for cross-section dependence are used. Therefore, before an appropriate 
choice of a panel unit root test is made it is crucial to provide some evidence on the 
degree of residual cross-section dependence.  
One way of testing for the presence of cross-section dependence in the data is to 
carry out the test of Pesaran (2004) and to compute the Cross section Dependence (CD) 
statistic. The test of Pesaran (2004) is based on a simple average of all pair-wise 
correlation coefficients of the OLS residuals (eit) obtained from standard augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (1979) regressions for each individual in the panel. Denoting by  ij  ˆ the 
sample estimate of the pair-wise correlation coefficient for the residuals for countries i 
and j calculated over T periods, we get: 
  
 
2 1/2 2 1/2
11 1
ˆˆ /( ) ( )
TT T
ij ji it jt it jt
tt t
ee e e 
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  
   
     . (4) 
 
The test statistic proposed by Pesaran (2004), which does not depend on any 
particular spatial weight matrix when the cross-sectional dimension (N) is large, is given 
by 
                                                 
4 Note that a specific form of cross-sectional dependence that has become popular is the factor structure 
approach. This has been used extensively in empirical work (see, for instance, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1992) and it has been analysed in theoretical treatments at even greater length. Therefore, in our study we 
use the notions of error cross-sectional dependence and factor structure dependence interchangeably.   16





















CD  , (5) 
 
and under its null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence it has asymptotically a 
standard normal distribution. The results reported in Table 2 provide evidence in favour 
of the existence of cross-sectional dependence in the data since for all series the CD 
statistics are always highly significant whatever the number of lags (from 1 to 4) 
included in the ADF regressions. In other words, one rejects the null hypothesis of 
cross-section independence 
 
Table 2 – Cross-section correlations of the errors in the ADF(p) regressions of real 
long-term interest rates and potential determinants (1973-2008; N = 17)
# 
  Real Long-Term Interest Rate (R)  Government Balance Ratio (GBR) 



















 Inflation  Surprises  (Π
e)  Current Account Balance Ratio (CA) 



















  Liquidity Debt Share (LIQ)  Real Effective Exchange Rate (TCR) 



















  Debt Ratio (DR)   











     
Note: Under the null of cross-sectional independence the CD statistic is distributed as a two-tailed 
standard normal. # Results based on the test of Pesaran (2004). 
The variable Inflation Surprises is calculated for each country as the difference between actual inflation 
and a moving average of two periods. 
 
4.3. Panel unit root testing 
Having put in evidence the presence of cross section dependence in real long-term 
interest rates, we now turn to the determination of the degree of integration of the series 
(real long-term interest rate, government balance ratio, current account balance, 
inflation surprises, real effective exchange rate, liquidity debt share, debt ratio) in our 
panel of 17 countries, using two second-generation panel unit root tests.  
The first 2
nd generation unit root test that we use is the test by Pesaran (2007) who 
suggests a simple way of getting rid of cross-sectional dependence that does not require 
the estimation of factor loading. His method is based on augmenting the usual ADF 
regression with the lagged cross-sectional mean and its first difference to capture the   17
cross-sectional dependence that arises through a single-factor model. The resulting 
individual ADF test statistics (CADF) or the rejection probabilities can then be used to 
develop modified versions of the t-bar test proposed by Im et al. (2003), such as the 









  ), or a truncated version of the 
CIPS statistic (CIPS
*) where the individual CADF statistics are suitably truncated to 
avoid undue influences of extreme outcomes that could arise when T is small (between 
10 and 20), or the inverse normal test (or the Z test) suggested by Choi (2001) that  
combine the p-values of the individual tests (CZ). Critical values reported in Pesaran 
(2007) are provided through Monte Carlo simulations for a specific specification of the 
deterministic component and depend both on the cross-sectional and time series 
dimensions. The null hypothesis of all tests is the unit root. 
The second set of unit root tests of the 2
nd generation are the bootstrap tests of 
Smith et al. (2004), which use a sieve sampling scheme to account for both the time 
series and cross-sectional dependencies of the data through bootstrap blocks. The 
specific tests that we consider are denoted t, LM , max , and min . t is the bootstrap 









  is a 
mean of the individual Lagrange Multiplier (LMi) test statistics, originally introduced 








  is a (more 
powerful) variant of the individual Lagrange Multiplier (LMi), with 
min min( , ) if i r i LM LM  , where  fir i LM and LM are based on forward and backward 
regressions (see Smith et al., 2004 for further details). We use bootstrap blocks of 
m=20.
5All four tests are constructed with a unit root under the null hypothesis and 
heterogeneous autoregressive roots under the alternative, which indicates that a 
rejection should be taken as evidence in favour of stationarity for at least one country. 
The results of the second generation panel unit root tests proposed by Pesaran 
(2007) are reported in Table 3 and provide support of the existence of a unit root in all 
series under consideration. This conclusion, which is robust to the number of lags 
introduced in the ADF regressions (from p=1 to 4), should be considered as safe given 
                                                 
5 The results are not very sensitive to the size of the bootstrap blocks.    18
the large and significant degree of cross-section dependence in all series documented in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 3 – Panel unit root tests of Pesaran (2007) for real long-term interest rates and 
potential determinants (1973-2008; N = 17) 
  Real Long-Term Interest Rate (R)  Government Balance Ratio (GBR) 




















 Inflation  Surprises  (Π
e)  Current Account Balance Ratio (CA) 




















  Liquidity Debt Share (LIQ)  Real Effective Exchange Rate (TCR) 




















  Debt Ratio (DR)   












     
Notes: 1) A constant is included in the estimations. 
2) Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates stationarity at least in one country. 
3) Critical values are respectively of -2.40 at 1%, -2.22 at 5%, and -2.14 at 10%.   
* denotes rejection of the null at the 10 % significance level. 
CIPS – Cross-section augmented Im-Pesaran-Shin test. CIPS* – truncated CIPS test. 
 
Similar results in Table 4, suggest that for all the series the unit root null cannot be 
rejected at any conventional significance level by the four bootstrap tests of Smith et al 
(2004).
6 Therefore, we conclude that real long-term interest rates and their potential 
determinants (government balance ratio, current account balance ratio, inflation 
surprisess, real effective exchange rate, liquidity debt share, and government debt ratio) 





                                                 
6 The order of the sieve is allowed to increase with the number of time series observations at the rate T
1/3 
while the lag length of the individual unit root test regressions are determined using the Campbell and 
Perron (1991) procedure. Each test regression is fitted with a constant term only.  
7 The lag order in the individual ADF type regressions is selected for each series using the AIC model 
selection criterion. Another crucial issue is the selection of the order of the deterministic component. In 
particular, since the cross-sectional dimension is rather large here, it may seem restrictive not to allow at 
least some of the units to be trending, suggesting that the model should be fitted with both a constant and 
trend. However, since the trending turned out not to be very pronounced, we have considered that a 
constant is enough in our analysis. Actually, the results of the bootstrap tests of Smith et al. (2004) are not 
very sensitive to the inclusion of a trend in addition to a constant in the estimated equation (see Statistic b 
in Table 4). We have of course also checked using the tests by Pesaran (2007) and the bootstrap tests of 
Smith et al. (2004) that the first difference of the series are stationary, hence confirming that the series 
expressed in level are integrated of order one.   19
Table 4 – Panel unit root tests of Smith et al. (2004) for real long-term interest rates and 
potential determinants (1973-2008)
* 

















t   -1.528     0.325       -2.108      0.555       -1.590      0.275  -2.836      0.424 
LM   2.309  0.187  5.040      0.554       2.478  0.128  5.759      0.391 
max   -0.812     0.264  -1.526      0.807       -1.308      0.142  -1.419      0.128 
min   1.301  0.357  3.061      0.824       1.659      0.165  4.188      0.168 
 Inflation  Surprises  (Π

















t   -1.888     0.101       -1.893      0.754       -1.454      0.536       -2.218      0.330      
LM   4.375      0.122       4.640      0.742       3.551      0.288       5.609      0.354      
max   -0.825     0.686       -1.560      0.701       -1.366      0.065  -1.955      0.178      
min   1.652      0.633       3.366      0.731       3.200      0.057  4.568      0.218      
  Liquidity Debt Share (LIQ)  Real Effective Exchange Rate (TCR) 
















t    -1.965     0.133       -2.207      0.333       -1.815      0.131  -2.448      0.157      
LM   2.986  0.105  5.676      0.312       4.272      0.194  6.193      0.176      
max   -1.325  0.114  -1.538      0.712  -1.293      0.134  -1.772      0.189 
min   2.297      0.333       3.183      0.724  2.443      0.125  4.275      0.182 
  Debt Ratio (DR)   







P-value*      
t   -1.570     0.413       -2.216      0.419              
LM   2.649      0.659       4.949      0.510              
max   -1.541     0.087  -1.720      0.652              
min   2.584  0.105  3.217      0.780              
Notes: (a) Model includes a constant. (b) Model includes both a constant and a time trend. 
* Test based on Smith et al. (2004). Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates stationarity at least in one country.  All 
tests are based on 5,000 bootstrap replications to compute the p-values.  
Null hypothesis: unit root (heterogeneous roots under the alternative). 
 
4.3. Panel cointegration  
Given that all the series under investigation are integrated of order one, we now 
proceed with the two following steps. First, we perform 2
nd generation panel data 
cointegration tests (that allow for cross-sectional dependence among countries) to test 
for the existence of cointegration between real long-term interest rates and its potential 
determinants. Second, if a cointegrating relationship exists for all countries, we estimate 
for each country the cross-section augmented cointegrating regression 
 
) 6 ( ,..., 1 ; ,..., 1 , ) ( 2 1 T t N i u X r X i r it t t it i i it it it                  20
 
by the CCE estimation procedure proposed by Pesaran (2006) that allows for cross-
section dependencies that potentially arise from multiple unobserved common factors. 
The cointegrating regression is augmented with the cross-section averages of the 
dependent variable and the observed regressors as proxies for the unobserved factors. 
Accordingly,  t r and  t X denote respectively the cross-section averages of ri and Xi in 
year t. Note that the coefficients of the cross–sectional means (CSMs) do not need to 
have any economic meaning as their inclusion simply aims to improve the estimates of 
the coefficients of interest. Therefore, this procedure enables us to estimate the 
individual coefficients γi in a panel framework.
8  
In addition, we also compute the CCE-MG estimators of Pesaran (2006). For 
instance, for the γ parameter and its standard error for N cross-sectional units, they are 






























  , 
where  CCE i ˆ and ) ˆ ( CCE i   denote respectively the estimated individual country time-
series coefficients and their standard deviations.  
We now use the bootstrap panel cointegration test proposed by Westerlund and 
Edgerton (2007). This test relies on the popular Lagrange multiplier test of McCoskey 
and Kao (1998), and makes it possible to accommodate correlation both within and 
between the individual cross-sectional units. In addition, this bootstrap test is based on 
the sieve-sampling scheme, and has the advantage of significantly reducing the 
distortions of the asymptotic test. Another appealing advantage is that the joint null 
hypothesis is that all countries in the panel are cointegrated. Therefore, in case of non-
rejection of the null, we can assume that there is cointegration between real long-term 
interest rates and the potential determinants contained in X. In what follows we consider 




                                                 
8 Note that in order to estimate the long-run coefficients we have also implemented the Pooled Mean 
Group (PMG) estimators (see Pesaran and Smith (1995), Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999)), which allowed 
us to identify significant differences in country behaviour. However, we only report the results of the 
Common Correlated Effects (CCE) estimators developed by Pesaran (2006), since they allow taking 
unobservable factors into account, which would not be the case of the PMG estimators.   21
i)  X1= (Π
e, CA, DR), 
ii)  X2= (Π
e, CA, GBR), 
iii)  X3= (Π
e, CA, DR, GBR, TCR), 
iv)  X4= (Π
e, CA, DR, LIQ). 
 
The panel cointegration results from the asymptotic tests shown in Table 5, 
including a constant term, indicate the absence of a cointegrating relationship between 
real long-term interest rates and the different sets of potential determinants for our 
country panel. However, this result is based on conventional asymptotic critical values, 
calculated on the assumption of cross-sectional independence of countries, an 
assumption that is not true here given the significant cross-sectional correlation among 
the series documented previously (in Table 2). 
 
Table 5 – Panel cointegration between real long-term interest rates and different sets of 
potential determinants (1973-2008; N = 17), model with a constant term 
 
 





e, CA, DR)  7.430  0.000  0.840 
X2= (Π
e, CA, GBR)  7.385  0.000  0.782 
X3= (Π
e, CA, DR, GBR, TCR)  14.168  0.000  0.783 
X4= (Π
e, CA, DR, LIQ)  9.125  0.000  0.751 
Notes: the bootstrap is based on 2000 replications. 
a - The null hypothesis of the tests is cointegration of Real Long-Term Interest Rates and potential 
determinants series.  
  # Test based on Westerlund and Edgerton (2007). 
 
Therefore, given the existence of some cross-section dependence among 
individuals, we used bootstrap critical values.
9 In this case the conclusions of the tests 
are now more compelling, and retaining a 10% level of significance, we conclude that 
there is a long-run relationship between real long-term interest rates and most of the 
different sets of potential determinants for our panel of OECD countries. This implies in 
particular that over the longer run real long-term interest rates and their determinants 
move together in our OECD sample. In addition, Table 5 implies that strictly relying 
upon asymptotic critical values (i.e. neglecting cross-sectional dependence) may lead to 
wrong (opposite) conclusions about the macroeconomic and fiscal long-run links 
between real long-term interest rates and their potential determinants. 
                                                 
9 As pointed out by a referee “provided that the bootstrap method is appropriate for the problem and 
implemented correctly, then the bootstrap critical values will be appropriate also in the absence of cross-
sectional correlation: they would just be closer to the asymptotic ones.”   22
 
4.5. The magnitudes of the cointegration relationship 
We then estimate equation (6) for the four different sets of variables included in 
X to assess the magnitude of the individual γicoefficient in the cointegrating relationship 
with the CCE estimation procedure developed by Pesaran (2006), which addresses 




it i i it i it i it it rC A D R u       , (6a) 
  123
e
it i i it i it i it it rC A G B R u       , (6b) 
  123 4 5
e
it i i it i it i it i it i it it rC A D R G B R T C R u           , (6c) 
  123 4
e
it i i it i it i it i it it rC A D R L I Q u         , (6d) 
 
with  1,..., , 1,..., iN tT  , and the respective estimation results are reported in Table 6. 
 
Table 6a – Individual country CCE estimates for 17 OECD countries (1973-2008) 
between real long-term interest rates and the X1= (Π
e, CA, DR) determinants  
 
Π
e CA DR  Constant  Country 
γ  t-Stat  γ  t-Stat  γ  t-Stat  α  t-Stat 
Austria  -0.681 -8.012 -0.149 -3.725 -0.011 -3.611  3.962  2.907 
Belgium -0.850  -14.167  -0.045  -2.682 -0.024 -2.600 -0.281 -2.257 
Canada  -0.885 -9.725 -0.133 -2.509 -0.032 -2.000 -0.978 -2.736 
Denmark  -0.645 -4.778 -0.040 -2.727  0.028  2.000 -1.497 -3.749 
Finland  -0.515 -4.769 -0.006 -0.120 -0.045 -1.957  2.222  3.467 
France -0.766  -12.355  -0.176  -3.520  0.049  5.444  -2.234  -3.659 
Germany -0.875  -4.581  0.262  2.148 -0.005 -2.167 -4.331 -4.746 
Ireland  -0.726 -8.643 -0.022 -2.759  0.023  2.300  1.573  2.637 
Italy  -0.690  -16.429 0.183 2.346 0.121 4.321  -5.388  -3.456 
Japan -0.944  -17.164  -0.109  -2.652 -0.047 -2.611 -3.396 -2.741 
Luxembourg -1.045  -40.192 0.003 0.029  -0.038  -1.267  -3.200  -2.839 
Netherlands -0.779  -10.819  -0.134  -1.523  0.017  3.850  -0.079  -2.034 
Portugal  -0.803  -13.164 0.114 3.563 0.001 0.000  -0.995  -3.531 
Spain -0.875  -13.258  0.058  2.784  -0.007  -1.400  5.189  6.163 
Sweden  -0.932  -22.732 -0.045 -0.517 -0.140 -5.385  4.017  3.088 
UK  -0.806  -14.140 0.051 2.125 0.081 3.375 0.267 2.286 
US  -0.407  -2.928 0.010 2.192 0.020 2.176 3.051 5.202 
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Table 6b – Individual country CCE estimates for 17 OECD countries (1973-2008) 
between real long-term interest rates and the X2= (Π
e, CA, GBR) determinants  
 
Π
e CA  GBR  Constant  Country 
γ  t-Stat  γ  t-Stat  γ  t-Stat  α  t-Stat 
Austria  -0.668 -9.408 -0.147 -3.675  0.027  2.692  2.397  3.405 
Belgium -0.796  -12.438  -0.142  -2.407  0.015  2.313  1.109  3.391 
Canada  -0.821 -8.642 -0.151 -3.283  0.076  2.854  0.680  2.932 
Denmark  -0.471 -3.680 -0.008 -2.178 -0.357 -1.812 -0.728 -2.874 
Finland  -0.399 -5.182 -0.039 -2.345 -0.200 -2.597 -0.231 -2.486 
France -0.892  -12.389  -0.045  -2.776 -0.100 -2.099 -1.499 -1.669 
Germany  -0.992  -6.161 0.137 3.593 0.128 2.422 0.461 2.645 
Ireland  -0.699 -8.034 -0.022 -0.564  0.058  2.289  1.909  3.094 
Italy -0.650  -13.000  0.142  2.958  -0.462  -4.200  0.021  2.017 
Japan -0.912  -22.244  -0.081  -1.306  0.114  3.081  0.178  3.231 
Luxembourg -1.021  -30.029  -0.047  -0.758 0.007 0.092  -2.851  -2.589 
Netherlands -0.762  -12.915  -0.028  -0.431 -0.179 -2.210 -0.322 -2.643 
Portugal  -0.909  -16.527 0.048 1.455 0.199 4.854 0.234 2.600 
Spain  -0.982 -9.627 -0.146 -2.168  0.175  2.869  0.421  2.636 
Sweden -0.990  -14.559  -0.397  -3.970  0.278  3.159  -0.989  -1.169 
UK -0.767  -11.984  -0.004  -0.148  0.068  2.194  0.221  2.795 
US  -0.341 -3.217 -0.132 -2.859 -0.118 -2.532  0.868  2.018 
Note the coefficients of the variables  t t X and r 1  of equation (6b) have not been reported in the table. 
 
Table 6c – Individual country CCE estimates for 17 OECD countries (1973-2008) 
between real long-term interest rates and the X3= (Π




e CA  DR  GBR  TCR  Constant  Country 
γ  t-Stat  γ  t-Stat  γ  t-Stat  γ  t-Stat  γ  t-Stat  α t-Stat 
Austria  -0.776    -10.778    -0.191    -4.244   -0.015   -2.750   0.065   2.121   -0.030    -2.714    -7.861   -3.551  
Belgium  -1.076    -13.450    0.050    2.042   -0.039   -4.333   0.021   1.583   -0.069    -4.600    8.764   4.382  
Canada  -0.851    -5.420    -0.038    -2.369   -0.005   -0.167   -0.058   -2.487   0.063    2.969    -2.404   -4.409  
Denmark  -0.706    -4.903    -0.087    -2.526   0.020   1.909   -0.166   -2.107   -0.022    -2.917    12.695   5.577  
Finland  -0.423    -5.494    -0.031    -0.633   -0.039   -2.786   -0.224   -3.733   0.006    0.375    -8.697   -2.077  
France  -0.745    -10.643    -0.252    -3.360   0.056   3.294   0.011   0.116   -0.047    -2.136    -9.387   -6.380  
Germany  -1.185    -5.925    0.127    2.221   -0.027   -0.675   0.147   2.909   -0.051    -2.244    -9.621   -7.912  
Ireland  -0.780    -5.612    -0.057    -2.727   -0.002   -0.105   0.075   2.415   -0.065    -2.140    -3.507   -4.634  
Italy  -0.733    -16.289    0.178    2.507   0.110   3.929   -0.227   -2.610   -0.115    -2.018    10.527   6.426  
Japan  -0.917    -17.635    -0.139    -2.106   -0.010   -0.455   0.072   2.323   -0.015    -1.000    -9.007   -5.795  
Luxembourg  -1.049    -38.852    0.059    1.656   -0.046   -2.769   -0.038   -0.413   0.014    2.560    -10.050   -2.012  
Netherlands  -0.827    -15.315    0.136    2.333   -0.021   -2.050   -0.044   -0.647   -0.062    -6.889    0.454   2.054  
Portugal  -0.927    -22.071    0.006    0.109   -0.012   -2.200   0.165   3.667   -0.010    -1.000    1.843   2.376  
Spain  -0.961    -21.356    -0.114    -2.107   -0.009   -2.250   0.070   2.258   -0.021    -2.750    1.798   2.271  
Sweden  -0.884    -24.556    -0.158    -2.179   -0.045   -1.818   0.104   2.852   0.026    2.625    3.535   3.399  
UK  -0.832    -21.333    0.009    0.409   0.101   4.391   0.106   4.417   -0.062    -3.444    -2.073   -2.726  
US  -0.435    -5.000    -0.066    -2.245   -0.041   -2.864   -0.150   -2.705   0.034    3.919    21.341   4.109  




   24
Table 6d – Individual country CCE estimates for 17 OECD countries (1973-2008) 
between real long-term interest rates and the X4= (Π
e, CA, DR, LIQ) determinants  
 
  Π
e CA  DR  LIQS  Constant 
Country  γ  t-Stat  γ  t-Stat  γ  t-Stat  γ  t-Stat  α t-Stat 
Austria -0.647  -7.890  -0.091  -2.459  0.008  2.400 -0.439 -3.663  -28.650 -2.304 
Belgium -1.063  -18.982  0.145  2.843  -0.031 -2.214 -0.900 -3.180  24.210 2.907 
Canada -0.918  -9.180  -0.139  -2.725  -0.009 -2.600 -5.752 -5.321  -10.417 -0.576 
Denmark -0.707  -4.842  0.090  2.250  0.053  3.359 -0.218 -2.172  41.473 4.401 
Finland -0.536  -6.700  -0.026  -2.667  -0.025 -2.087 -0.263 -3.697  -5.988 -2.528 
France -0.759  -13.316  -0.215  -4.778  0.052  3.250 -1.751 -2.447  -47.188 -4.047 
Germany -0.899  -5.197  0.191  1.201  0.032  2.744 -0.271 -2.362  -14.353 -5.467 
Ireland -0.729  -8.679  0.022  0.786  0.010 2.500 0.420 3.719  -12.185  -3.954 
Italy -0.755  -15.729  0.185  2.569  0.222  5.286 -12.00 -3.087  -36.057 -6.857 
Japan -0.914  -12.694  -0.056  -2.824  -0.042 -3.680 -0.310 -2.314  -26.735 -7.756 
Luxembourg -1.039  -30.559 0.050 0.538  -0.059  -2.458 1.052 3.930     -1.959 -2.053 
Netherlands -0.826 -14.000  -0.126  -2.636 0.015 2.556  -0.159  -1.924  -58.738  -4.485 
Portugal -0.802  -12.935  0.086  2.867  -0.001 -2.100 -1.460 -2.209  16.218 2.074 
Spain -0.950  -20.652  -0.088  -1.846  0.002  2.000 -0.100 -2.632  22.840 3.579 
Sweden -0.846  -15.107  0.006  1.067  -0.149  -5.960 0.059 2.458  34.877 3.864 
UK -0.820  -14.643  0.052  2.080  0.101  2.629 -12.78 -6.423  8.191 5.334 
US -0.522  -3.896  0.030  2.698  -0.024  -3.500 5.151 5.575  -12.222  -3.207 
Note the coefficients of the variables  t t X and r 1  of equation (6d) have not been reported in the table. 
 
From Table 6a we can observe that real long-term interest rates are statistically 
and positively affected by changes in the debt-to-GDP ratio for seven out of 17 
countries. Regarding inflation surprises they have a negative and statistically significant 
effect on real long-term interest rates in all countries. In addition, the effect of the 
external imbalances is statistically significant and negative (positive) for nine (five) 
countries. In other words, the deterioration of the current account balance would signal 
mostly a widening gap between savings and investment and long-term interest rates 
may be pushed upwards.  
The results of an alternative specification are reported in Table 6b where the debt-
ratio is replaced by the government budget balance ratio. In this case, a better (more 
positive) government budget balance reduces the real long-term interest rate in six 
countries 
In Table 6c, the CCE estimations include simultaneously the two fiscal 
determinants of real long-term interest rates, the government budget balance ratio and 
the debt-to-GDP ratio, together with current account balances and the real effective 
exchange rate. According to the results, improvements in the government budget 
balance reduce the real long-term interest rate in seven countries (five in a statistically 
significant way). The real effective exchange rate has a statistically significant negative   25
effect in ten countries, with a depreciation reducing real long-term interest rates in the 
cointegration relationship. 
Concerning the relevance of the liquidity of the outstanding government debt, 
defined in (3), as a determinant of long-term government bond yields, the related results 
are reported in Table 6d, considering the debt-to-GDP ratio as a determinant as well The 
effect of an increased country specific sovereign liquidity in the government debt 
market contributes to reduce long-term interest rates in 13 cases. In addition, we can 
observe that inflation surprises still have a statistically significant negative effect on real 
long-term interest rates in all countries, while higher debt ratios also imply higher long-
term interest rates for nine countries, and current account deteriorations push up real 
interest rates in ten cases.  
Finally, the results from the common correlated effects mean group (CCE-MG) 
method are reported in Table 7. We can see that the estimated long-run relationships for 
the real long-term interest rates confirm the statistical relevance of inflation, current 
account balances, budgetary balances, government debt and of the liquidity proxy. 
 
Table 7 – Results for common correlated effects mean group (CCE-MG) estimations, 17 
OECD countries (1973-2008) 

















































TCR    -0.026 
(-3.98) 
 
LIQS       -1.749 
(-5.35) 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
4.6. Estimation of a panel ECM representation 
In the previous sub-section we have estimated the long-run relationships 
between real long-term interest rates and their potential determinants for our panel of 17 
OECD countries, using the common correlated effects mean group (CCE-MG) 
estimates (see Table 7). Having established the long-run structure of the underlying data   26
and given that there exists a long-run relationship for all countries in our four panel sets, 
we turn to the estimation of the complete panel error-correction model (PECM) 
described by equation (7): 
 
   11 1
10
() ( ) ( )
pp
it it j it j it j j it j i it it it it
jj
ii X iX           

            .(7) 
 
We use the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) approach of Pesaran, Shin and Smith 
(1999), with long-run parameters obtained with CCE techniques, in order to obtain the 
estimates of the loading factors λi (weights or error correction parameters, or speed of 
adjustment to the equilibrium values), as well as of the short-run parameters βj and θj for 
each country of our panel. Consequently, the loading factors and short-run coefficients 
are allowed to differ across countries.
10  
The lag length structure p is chosen using the Schwarz (SC) and Hannan-Quinn 
(HQ) selection criteria, and by carrying out a standard likelihood ratio testing-down 
type procedure to examine the lag significance from a long-lag structure (started with 
p=4) to a more parsimonious one. Afterwards, in order to improve the statistical 
specification of the model, we implemented systematically Wald tests of exclusion of 
lagged variables from the short-run dynamic (they are not reported here) to eliminate 
insignificant short-run estimates at the 5% level. We tested the residuals from each 
PECM model for the absence of heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, ARCH effect, and 
we can report that they are not subject to misspecification. The results of the PECM 
estimations based on (7) for the different sets of potential determinants previously 
considered are reported in Table 8, only for significant short-run estimates at the 5% 
level. 
                                                 
10 Note that before considering equation (7), we first used a Wald statistic to test for common parameters 
across countries (i.e λi= λ, and γi=γ, for i=1,...,N) with the CCE techniques of Pesaran, (2006), that allow 
common factors in the cross-equation covariances to be removed. We found that only the null hypothesis 
γi=γ, for i=1,…,N was not rejected by data, whereas the speeds of adjustment λi vary considerably across 
countries (results are available upon request). Table 8a – Panel Error-Correction estimations for rit, X1= (Π
e, CA, DR), 1973-2008 








































    -0.08 
(-2.91) 
Finland 
  -0.51 
(-4.35) 
      -0.10 
(-3.12) 
France 


















































































































    -0.06 
(-2.84) 
US 





















      
Notes: The estimations are obtained from the Pooled Mean Group approach with long-run parameters estimated 
with CCE techniques. The coefficients of the variables  t t X and r 1  of equation (6a) have not been reported in the 
table. t-statistics are in brackets. r – real long-term interest rate; CA – current account balance; 
e – inflation surprises; 
DR – debt ratio.    28
Table 8b – Panel Error-Correction estimations for rit, X2= (Π
e, CA, GBR), 1973-2008 




it-1  CAit  CAit-1  CAit-2  GBRit  GBRit-1  Loading 
factor λi 
Austria 








































   -0.49 
(-3.99) 
       -0.07 
(-2.86) 
France 































































   -1.04 
(-2.02) 
       -0.17 
(-3.74) 
Netherlands 































   -0.77 
(-7.69) 
       -0.13 
(-2.70) 
UK 
   -0.83 
(-13.2) 
       -0.05 
(-2.76) 
US 






















       
Notes: The estimations are obtained from the Pooled Mean Group approach with long-run parameters 
estimated with CCE techniques. The coefficients of the variables  t t X and r 1  of equation (6b) have not been 
reported in the table. t-statistics are in brackets. r – real long-term interest rate; CA – current account balance; 
e – 
inflation surprises; GBR – budget balance ratio.    29
Table 8c – Panel Error-Correction estimations for rit, X3= (Π
e, CA, DR, GBR, TCR), 
1973-2008 




























    -0.04 
(-2.49) 
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(-2.25) 
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(-2.04) 
France 
   -0.27 
(-3.52) 
    -0.37 
(-4.02) 
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(-2.24) 
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(-2.26) 


















    -0.07 
(-2.94) 
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(-3.02) 




















    -0.02 
(-2.15) 











    -0.14 
(-2.94) 



















          
Notes: The estimations are obtained from the Pooled Mean Group approach with long-run parameters estimated 
with CCE techniques. The coefficients of the variables  t t X and r 1  of equation (6c) have not been reported in the 
table. t-statistics are in brackets. r – real long-term interest rate; CA – current account balance; 
e – inflation surprises; DR – 
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Table 8d – Panel Error-Correction estimations for rit, X4= (Π
e, CA, DR, LIQ), 1973-
2008 





























































































































































     -0.215 
(-2.80) 







































        
Notes: The estimations are obtained from the Pooled Mean Group approach with long-run parameters estimated with 
CCE techniques. The coefficients of the variables  t t X and r 1  of equation (6d) have not been reported in the table. T-
statistics are in brackets. r – real long-term interest rate; CA – current account balance; 
e – inflation surprises; DR – debt ratio; 
LIQ – liquidity proxy based on the debt share. 
 
  The government debt ratio shows up in the short-run estimated coefficients with 
a positive sign (Table 8a), implying an upward pressure on the real interest rate, and 
also with a negative sign at one lag for some cases, which could eventually be related to 
gains from liquidity. Again, improvements in the government budget balance (Table 8b) 
contribute to a reduction in the real sovereign yields. The real effective exchange rate 
depreciation movements push up the real interest rate, which may reflect higher 
exchange risk linked to external imbalances (Table 8c), while better current account 
positions also reduce real interest rates. Interestingly, our liquidity proxy (Table 8d) 
shows up as statistically significant in the error-correction estimations, implying that   31
liquidity is also relevant from a short-term perspective, as already seen before in the 
long-run estimation results. Naturally, we can not discard different perceptions towards 
liquidity if financial conditions are extremely disruptive as for instance, in a financial 
crisis. Finally, the magnitude of the speed of adjustment across the several error-
correction specifications is rather similar. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we assessed the short and long-run behaviour of long-term 
government bond yields for a set of 17 OECD countries, for the period 1973-2008. We 
employed a dynamic panel approach, in order to reflect financial and economic 
integration, and to increase the performance and accuracy of the tests. We also used 
simulation and bootstrap methods to compute the critical values, and to take into 
account the cross-country dependences in the sovereign bond segment of the capital 
markets. Indeed, as put in evidence in the literature, panel unit root tests of the first 
generation can lead to spurious results if one ignores the existence of significant degrees 
of positive error cross-section dependence (reflecting, for instance, financial markets 
integration and liberalisation, or increased business cycle synchronization).  
Indeed, we were able to reject the null hypothesis of cross-section independence 
for the real long-term interest rates (and for its determinants), since the positive error 
cross-section dependence cannot be ignored. Therefore, after having established, with 
the use of 2
nd generation panel unit root tests, that all the series in the sample panel are 
non-stationary and integrated of order one, we have undertaken afterwards an adequate 
bootstrap panel cointegration analysis.  
Specifically, first we estimated for each country the long-run relationship between 
real long-term interest rates and its potential determinants using the Common Correlated 
Effects (CCE and CCE-MG) procedures of Pesaran (2006), that allow for cross-section 
dependencies (potentially arising from multiple unobserved common factors). Then, we 
estimated the panel error correction models for the real long-term interest rates, where 
short- and long-run effects are estimated jointly from a general autoregressive 
distributed-lag (ARDL) model using the Pooled Mean Group approach of Pesaran, Shin 
and Smith (1999), and where short-run effects were allowed to vary across countries. 
This approach takes advantage of the increased power of panel techniques. 
From an economic point of view, it is relevant to find indeed such cross-section 
dependence, both for the financial series and for the macroeconomic and fiscal   32
variables. In fact, this provides evidence of significant capital markets integration at the 
OECD level, stemming, for instance, from common fiscal behaviour, notably in the 
European Union, financial markets’ integration and liberalisation, and business cycle 
synchronization, which sovereign government debt issuers cannot discard lightly.  
The results of our analysis also show that in addition to common movements in 
sovereign yields, investors are also aware of such country specific factors as inflation, 
budgetary and current account imbalances, and real effective exchange rates. A better 
(more positive) government budget balance reduces, as expected, the real long-term 
interest rate in almost all countries. Additionally, the developments in current account 
balances also carry relevant long-run information for real interest rates. Indeed, the 
deterioration of the current account balance would signal a widening gap between 
savings and investment and long-term interest rates may be pushed upwards. 
Moreover, our results illustrate that over the longer run real long-term interest 
rates and their potential determinants move together in this sample of OECD countries. 
Therefore, identifying the determinants of real long-term interest rates, over long 
periods as captured by the cointegration analysis, offers additional valuable information 
notably for financing choices decisions by the sovereign issuers and government 
investment decisions. Interestingly, some long-run determinants of real long-term 
interest rates, which were uncovered in the panel cointegration estimation, such as 
liquidity, are also relevant from a short-run perspective. 
From a policymaking point of view the relationship between fiscal and external 
imbalances and long-term interest rates is timely in the context of economic and 
financial uncertainty, when pressures for macroeconomic activism are exercised on 
fiscal authorities, increasing short- and medium-term fiscal risks. Furthermore, it is 
often argued that large and unsustainable fiscal deficits can endanger the coherence of 
national macroeconomic policies and may jeopardize the price-stability objectives of a 
monetary union.   
Regarding future work, we could envisage evaluating the data at different 
frequencies depending on the time-span and variable availability. For instance, mixed 
frequencies can, to some extent be recovered for the relevant financial and macro 
variables, and the issue has not been dealt in the existing literature at length. 
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Appendix – Data sources 
 
Long-term interest rate – Government Bond Yield, refers to one or more series 
representing yields to maturity of government bonds or other bonds that would 
indicate longer term rates, code IFS 61.Z.F. Source: International Financial Statistics, 
IMF. 
Inflation – Consumer Price Index, code IFS 64.XZF. Source: International Financial 
Statistics, IMF. 
Government debt ratio – Debt-to-GDP ratio, code 1.0.319.0.UDGGL. Source: European 
Commission AMECO database. 
Government balance ratio – Budget balance-to-GDP ratio, code 1.0.319.0.UBLGE. 
Source: European Commission AMECO database. 
GDP – GDP at market prices, code 1.0.0.0.UVGD. Source: European Commission 
AMECO database. 
Current account balance – Current Balance as a Percentage of GDP, code CBGDPR. 
Source: Balance of Payments, OECD Economic Outlook. 
Real effective exchange rate – chain-linked index with base period 2005, code 
CCRETT01.IXOB. Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 